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We try to asses the role of housing price movements in the optimal
design of monetary policy rules. Even though the relevance of liquidity
constraints for consumption behavior has been well documented in the
empirical and theoretical literature little attention has been given to credit
frictions at the household level in the monetary business cycle literature.
This paper represents the ￿rst attempt of a welfare-based monetary
policy evaluation in a model with heterogeneous agents and credit con-
straints at the household level. In order to evaluate optimal monetary
policy we take advantage of the recent advances in computational eco-
nomics by following the approach illustrated by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2003). Our results show that housing price movements should not be a
separate target variable additional to in￿ ation, in an optimally designed
simple monetary policy rule
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11 Introduction
The recent rise in housing prices in most of the OECD countries has attracted
the attention of policy makers and academics and raised concerns about the
macroeconomic implications1.
What signi￿cance do asset prices have for monetary policy? A number of
papers have tried to understand the extent to which asset price movements
should be relevant for monetary policy2. Cecchetti et al. (2000 and 2002) show
that reacting to asset prices, reduces the likelihood that bubbles form. On the
other hand, Bernanke and Gertler (2001), among others, conclude that in￿ ation-
targeting central banks should not respond to asset prices. In fact, conditional
on a strong response to in￿ ation, the gain from responding to asset prices is
negligible. Both studies employ a ￿nancial accelerator framework allowing for
credit market frictions and exogenous asset price bubbles. The methodology
adopted for evaluating the performance of di⁄erent monetary policy rules is
based on the implied volatility of output and in￿ ation. Di⁄erent conclusions
about the desiderability of including asset prices as an additional argument in
the monetary policy rule, depend on di⁄erent assumptions about the stochastic
nature of the model, i.e. the shocks considered.
Directly related to housing prices is the analysis by Iacoviello (2004). He
shows the relevance of housing prices in the transmission and ampli￿cation of
shocks to the real sector. Nevertheless, when computing the in￿ ation-output
volatility frontiers it turns out that a response to housing prices does not yield
signi￿cant gains in terms of output and in￿ ation stabilization.
The main shortcoming of all this literature is the absence of welfare con-
siderations in evaluating optimal monetary policy. The only exception is the
analysis conducted by Faia and Monacelli (2004). Relying on a welfare-based
approach they show that reacting to asset prices is optimal but do not generate
relevant welfare improvements. On the other hand, responses to changes in the
1See among others Borio and Mc Guire (2004) for the relation between housing and eq-
uity prices, Iacoviello (2004) for the relevance of housing prices and credit constraints in the
business cycle, Girouard-Bl￿ndal (2001) for the role of housing prices in sustaining consump-
tion spending in the recent downturn of the world economy, Case-Quiugley-Shiller (2001) for
empirical evidence on the housing wealth e⁄ect.
2See e.g. Filardo (2000), Goodhart (2000), Batini and Nelson (2000), Bernanke and Gertler
(1999, 2001), Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000), Cecchetti, Genberg and Wad-
hwani(2003), Taylor(2001), Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2003), Faia and Monacelli (2004).
2leverage ratio generate more pronounced deviations from a strict price stability
policy.
This paper studies optimal monetary policy rules in an economy with credit
market frictions at the household level and heterogeneous agents. The aim is to
asses the role of household indebtedness and housing prices in designing mon-
etary policy. The paper is related to the large literature on optimal monetary
policy in economies with nominal rigidities3. This literature assumes that the
central bank is a benevolent policy maker, thus, maximizes consumers￿welfare4.
Most of the models consider a dynamic system centered around an e¢ cient non-
distorted equilibrium. In practice, the policy maker neutralizes any source of
ine¢ ciency present in the economy and not related to the existence of nominal
rigidities. Thus, the only duty left to monetary policy is to o⁄set the distortions
associated with price rigidities in order to replicate the ￿ exible price equilibrium
3See among others, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999),
King and Wolman (1999), Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000),
4The literature is divided in two streams on the base of a main assumption regarding the
deterministic equilibrium around which the model economy evolves.
3allocation. The motivation behind this modelling choices is purely technical.
In fact, it is su¢ cient a ￿rst order approximation of the equilibrium conditions
to approximate welfare up to the second order5. Following a method introduced
by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) in these kinds of models it is possible to
derive a discounted quadratic loss function from the quadratic approximation of
the utility function, and compute optimal policy using a simple linear-quadratic
methodology as in the traditional monetary policy theory.
An alternative approach, studies optimal monetary and ￿scal policy in mod-
els evolving around equilibria that remain distorted6. These are models in which
di⁄erent types of distortions, beside price rigidities, proved a rationale for the
conduct of monetary policy. In order to get a welfare measure that is accurate
to the second order7 it is necessary to use a higher order approximation of the
model￿ s equilibrium conditions. The method suggested by Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003) shows that a second order solution to the model￿ s policy functions
is required for the approximation of the welfare function to be accurate up to
the second order. Another way of evaluating a welfare measure accurate up to
the second order, is proposed by Benigno and Woodford (2003) as an extension
of Rotemberg and Woodford￿ s method. On the base of the computation of a
second order approximation to the model￿ s structural equations it is possible
to substitute out the linear terms in the Taylor approximation to the expected
utility and obtain a "pure quadratic" approximation to the welfare function (no
linear terms). Once a quadratic function is derived optimal monetary policy can
be evaluated using as constraints the ￿rst order approximation to the model￿ s
equations. Thus, the linear-quadratic methodology is reintroduced again.
Our model economy is characterized by three types of distortions. First,
nominal price rigidities, modelled as quadratic adjustment cost on good mar-
ket price setting are adopted as a source of monetary non neutrality. Second,
monopolistic competition in the good market allows for price setting above the
marginal cost. Third, credit market imperfections, generated by the assump-
tion that creditors cannot force debtors to repay unless debts are secured by
5See Woodford (2003)
6See Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2004), Benigno and Woodford (2004), Faia and Monacelli
(2004).
7Up to a ￿rst order accuracy the agents￿discounted utility function equals its non-stochastic
steady state value. Since the monetary policy rules commonly considered do not a⁄ect the
non-stochastic steady state, it is not possible to rank di⁄erent rules on the base of ￿rst order
approximation.
4collateral, generate a role for housing prices.
Even though the relevance of liquidity constraints for consumption behavior
has been well documented in the empirical and theoretical literature ￿see Zeldes
(1997), Jappelli and Pagano (1997) among others ￿little attention has been
given to credit frictions at the household level in the monetary business cycle
literature. In fact, this paper represents the ￿rst attempt of a welfare-based
monetary policy evaluation in a model with heterogeneous agents and credit
constraints at the household level.
The model is built on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (KM henceforth). In order
to generate a motive for the existence of credit ￿ ows, two types of agents are
assumed. They di⁄er in terms of discount factors: as a consequence impatient
agents are borrowers. Credit constraints arise because lenders cannot force
borrowers to repay. Thus, physical assets are used as collateral for loans. As
in Iacoviello (2004), we depart from KM￿ s framework from two main features.
First, di⁄erently from KM we focus on the household sector. In fact, KM￿ s
agents are entrepreneurs that produce and consume the same good using a
physical asset. Agents are risk neutral and represent two di⁄erent sectors of the
economy - borrowers are "farmers" and lenders are "gatherers". On the contrary,
we model households that, apart from getting utility from a ￿ ow of consumption
and disutility from labor according to a strictly concave function, and consider
house holding as a separate argument of their utility function. Housing services
are assumed to be proportional to the real amount of housing stock held. In
our setup both groups of agents are identical, only di⁄erence is the subjective
discount factor. Second, we extend the model to include nominal price rigidities
and a role for monetary policy. Iacoviello (2004) doesn￿ t distinguish between
residencial and commercial properties. Thus, houses are not only a source of
direct utility but also an input of production and the asset used in the credit
market to secure both ￿rms￿and households￿debts8. These modelling choices
are consistent with the aim of showing the importance of ￿nancial factors for
macroeconomic ￿ uctuation. Instead, being interested in the role of housing
prices for the optimal design of monetary policy, we restrict our attention to
the household sector. In order to evaluate optimal monetary policy we take
8Iacoviello (2004), as Faia and Monacelli (2004),adds collateral constraints tied to ￿rms￿
real estate holdings (housing) to Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000) model. Moreover, he
also introduces collater constraits in the household sector.
5advantage of the recent advances in computational economics by following the
approach illustrated by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
In terms of monetary policy evaluation, the main elements that distinguish
our contribution are the use of a welfare-based evaluation of the optimal rules
instead of the in￿ ation-output volatility criterion (as in Iacoviello (2004)) and
the attention to both lenders￿and borrowers￿welfare in the implementation of
the welfare method. In fact, compared to Faia and Monacelli (2004) we do
not focus on the maximization of the lenders￿welfare but we adopt as relevant
measure the weighted avarege of borrowers￿and lenders￿welfare. Moreover, we
focus on the households￿sector in order to understand if housing prices - and
not generic asset prices - could be a variable of interest for monetary policy.
The results show that optimally designed simple monetary policy rules should
not take into account current housing prices movements. In fact, under normal
circumstances, we ￿nd out that an explicit objective of housing prices stability
is not welfare improving relative to a strict price stability policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
role of housing as a collateral. Section 3 lays out the model and derives the
equilibrium conditions. Section 4 turns its attention on the model￿ s calibration.
Section 5 describes the welfare measure considered and the methodology to
evaluate monetary policy￿ s optimal design. Section 6 comments on the results.
62 Housing Prices and Borrowing Constraint
Why should housing prices be relevant for monetary policy in a bubble-free
model? Our main hypothesis is that housing is used as a collateral in the
loan market and consequently housing prices are related to consumption and
economic activity through both a traditional wealth e⁄ect and a mortgage loans
market channel. An increas in housing prices contributes to a rise in the value
of the collateral that allows households to borrow more. As a consequence, the
increased household indebtedness could increase the sensitivity of households to
changes in the interest rate and sudden decreases in housing prices themselves.
Thus, housing prices movements are relevant to assess how private consumption
evolves and the ability of the household sector to smooth di⁄erent kind of shocks.
All this is taken into account by the welfare critirium we use. In fact, it consider
households￿present and future welfare.
We consider a modi￿ed version of the standard business cycle model in which
household derive utility from owning houses and using them as collateral in the
loan market. We depart from the representative agent framework assuming two
groups of agents: borrowers and lenders.
Borrowers face an external borrowing constraint. The constraint is not de-
rived endogenously but it is consistent with standard lending criteria used in the
mortgage and consumer loans market. The borrowing constraint is introduced
through the assumption that households cannot borrow more than a fraction of
the value of their houses. The household borrows (Bit) against the value of his
housing wealth.
Bit ￿ ￿Et[Qt+1hit] (1)
where Qt+1 is the housing prices and hit is the stock of housing. Mortgage
loans re￿nancing takes place every period and the household repays every new
loan after one period. It seems quite realistic that the overall value of the loan
cannot be higher than a fraction of the expected value of the collateral. The
fraction ￿, referred to as loan to value ratio, should not exceed one. This can
be explained thinking of the overall judicial costs which a creditor incurs in
case of the debtor default. Since housing prices a⁄ect the collateral value of
the houses, ￿ uctuations in the price plays a large role in the determination of
7borrowing conditions at household level. Borrowing against an higher value of
the house is used to ￿nance both investment in housing and consumption. The
other source of mortgage equity withdrawal is given by an increase in the value
of the collateral due to a rise the loan to value ratio.
3 The Model
Consider a sticky prices model populated by a monopolistic competitive good
producing ￿rm, a monetary authority and two types of households. In order
to impose the existence of ￿ ows of credit in this economy we assume ex-ante
heterogeneity at the household level: agents di⁄ers in terms of the subjective
discount factor. We assume a continuum of households of mass 1: n Impatient
Households (lower discount rate) that borrow in equilibrium and (1-n) Patient
Households (higher discount rate) that lend in equilibrium.
3.1 Households
The households derive utility from a ￿ ow of consumption and services from
house holding - that are assumed to be proportional to the real amount of









with i = 1;2 and ￿1 > ￿2 s.t. a budget constraint






+ wtLit + fit ￿ Tit
and a borrowing constraint
bit ￿ ￿Et[qt+1￿t+1hit] (2)
Except for the gross nominal interest rate, R, all the variables are expressed
in real terms. ￿t is the gross in￿ ation (Pt=Pt￿1) and qt is the price of housing
in real terms (Qt=Pt). The household can borrow (bt) using as a collateral
the next period￿ s expected value of real estate holdings (the stock of housing).
This borrowing constraint will hold only for the impatient households since the
patient ones will lend in equilibrium. In the budget constraint Tit are lump sum
8taxes from the ￿scal authority, and fit are the dividends from ￿rms. We assume
that only the patient households own the ￿rms. Thus, f1t = 1
(1￿N) (Dt=pt)
where Dt are the dividends of the representative ￿rm and f2t = 0:







Uci;tqt ￿ ￿iEtUci;t+1qt+1 ￿ Uhi;t
The second equation relates the marginal bene￿t of borrowing to its marginal





, is bigger or equal to the marginal utility of
housing services.
3.1.1 Impatient Households
We can show that Impatient Households borrow up to the maximum in a neigh-
borhood of the steady state. If fact, if we consider the euler equation of the
impatient household in steady state
￿2 = (￿1 ￿ ￿2)Uc2 > 0
where ￿2t is the lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint9.
Thus, the borrowing constraint holds with equality in a neighborhood of the
steady state
b2t = ￿Et[qt+1￿t+1h2t]





￿ ￿t = ￿2EtUc2t+1
1
￿t+1
9Once we assume the existence of di⁄erent discount factors with ￿ ￿1 > ￿2￿ in the deter-
ministic steady state the household caracterized by ￿2 is willing to borrow up to the maximum.
9Thus, for constrained agents the marginal bene￿ts of borrowing are always big-
ger than the marginal cost.
Uh2t + ￿2EtUc2t+1qt+1 + ￿t￿Etqt+1￿t+1 = Uc2tqt
Moreover, the marginal bene￿t of holding one unit of housing is given not only
by its marginal utility but also by the marginal bene￿t of being allowed to
borrow more.
3.1.2 Patient Households
Since the patient households￿borrowing constraint is not binding in a neigh-
borhood of the steady state it faces a standard problem, only exception is the








Uh1t + ￿1EtUc1t+1qt+1 = Uc1tqt
3.2 Firms
3.2.1 The ￿nal good producing ￿rms
Perfectly competitive ￿rms produce a ￿nal good yt using yt(i) units of each
intermediate good i 2 (0;1) adopting a constant return to scale, diminishing























10The price of the intermediate good yt(i) is denoted by Pt(i) and taken as given
by the competitive ￿nal good producing ￿rm. The solution yields the following
constant price elasticity (￿) demand function for good i that is homogeneous of







Combining the demand function with the production function is possible to






3.2.2 The intermediate sector
In the wholesale sector there is a continuum of ￿rms indexed by i 2 (0;1)
and owned by consumers. Intermediate producing ￿rms act on a monopolistic
market and produce yt(i) units of di⁄erentiated good i using Lt(i) units of labor
according to the following constant return to scale technology
ZtLt(i) ￿ yt(i)
where Zt is the aggregate productivity shock and follows the autoregressive
process
ln(Zt) = ￿Z ln(Zt￿1) + "Zt; "Zt viid N(0;￿"Z); 0 < ￿Z < 1
Cost Minimization Monopolistic competitive ￿rms hire labor from house-
holds in a competitive market on period by period basis. Cost minimization






and thus the total cost could be written in the following way10:
WtLt(i) = sn
t (i)yt(i)
10In equilibrium the ￿rm chooses input such that the marginal product equals the markup





= (1 + ￿t)Wt
11Price Setting Assume now that intermediate ￿rms set the price of their dif-
ferentiated good every period, but facing a quadratic cost of adjusting the price








where ￿p > 0 represent the degree of nominal rigidity and ￿ is the gross steady




















Uc1t is the relevant discount factor. The ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts in














Using the results from the cost minimization problem, we replaced the real
total costs , wtLt(i), with a function of real marginal costs and total output13.



























11The Calvo setting (most commonly used) and the price adjustment cost setting deliver
the same linearized system of necessary conditions up to a reparametrization. For a second
order approximation this is not true. The second order term in the resource constraint and in
the ￿rms￿FOC do not allow to have a one-to-one mapping between the two models.
The second order terms in the Calvo setting are ultimately related to the second order
moments of the price distribution - while for the other case they are simply related to the
chosen adjustment costs functional form. However, given the demanding assumptions of the
re-setting process in a framework a la Calvo, it is hard to tell which of the two set-up are
quantitatively more reliable.
For sparing computing time we have preferred the price adjustment cost framework.
12See Kim JME 1995
13





































3.3 The Fiscal Authority
We assume:
Gt = Tt
where Gt is government consumption of the ￿nal good and Tt are lump sum
taxes/transfers, where Tt = (1￿n)T1t +nT2t:Government consumption evolves
according to the following exogenous process:
(lnGt ￿ lnG) = ￿G (lnGt￿1 ￿ lnG)+"Gt where "Gt viid N(0;￿"G); 0 < ￿G < 1
where G is the steady state share of government consumption.
3.4 Equilibrium and Aggregation
3.4.1 Equilibrium Conditions
In the symmetric equilibrium, all ￿rms make identical decisions, so that:
yt(i) = Yt Pt(i) = Pt L(i) = Lt
Consequently, total production becomes
Yt = ZtLt (3)




























(1 ￿ n)L1t + nL2t = Lt (1 ￿ n)c1t + nc2t = Ct
(1 ￿ n)b1t + nb2t = 0 (1 ￿ n)h1t + nh2t = 1
Tt = (1 ￿ n)T1t + nT2t Gt = Tt
13where Ht is in ￿x supply normalized to 1. Resource constraint








The production of the ￿nal sector needs to be allocated to resources costs arising
from the prices￿ adjustment and to private consumption by households and
government. This condition together with the household￿ s and ￿rm￿ s ￿rst order
conditions, the law of motion of the exogenous shocks, the central bank policy
rule, the borrowing constraint and one of the two budget constraints constitute a
system of non linear di⁄erence equations describing the behavior in equilibrium
of prices ad quantities: After loglinearizing the system around its steady state
we obtain the system of linear di⁄erence equations that determine the dynamics
of the state and costate variables.
4 Calibration
We set the parameters of the model on the base of quarterly evidence. The
households￿discount factors are (￿1;￿2) = (0:99;0:98). Patient Households￿
discount factor implies an average annual rate of return of about 4%. Previous
estimates of discount factors for poor or young households14 have been used as











For simplicity we assume log-utility for consumption, ’c = 1 (risk aversion),
and we set ’L = 2 (inverse of labor supply elasticity): The weight on labor
disutility, ￿L; equals 1, while ￿h = 0:019: This last parameter implies a steady
state value of real estate over annual output of 140%. In line with the literature
on nominal rigidities, we set the elasticity of substitution, ￿, equal 11. The
baseline choice for the loan to value ratio15, ￿, is 50% and the fraction of
borrowed constraint population is settle to 50%. We calibrate the steady state
government consumption value as the 20% of total output. Following Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004) we calibrate the technology and government spending
14In fact, Lawrance (1991) and Samwick (1998) estimate discount factors, respectively, for
poor and young households in the range (0.97, 0.98).
15Using US data from 1974 to 2003, Iacoviello (2004) estimates the households￿loan to valio
ratio equal to 0.55.
14shocks according to standard values in the real business cycle literature16. Tab.
1 summarizes the calibrated parameters.
Preferences
￿1 = 0:99 ’c = 1 ￿h = 0:019
￿2 = 0:98 ’L = 2 ￿L = 1
Technology BOC
￿ = 11 ￿ = 0:5
￿p = 161
Shocks
￿Z = 0:95 ￿Z = 0:0056
￿G = 0:9 ￿G = 0:0074
Table 1
5 Computation and Welfare Measure
5.1 Computation
Since Kydland and Prescott (1982)17 the ￿rst-order approximation approach
is the most popular numerical approximation method for solving models too
complex to deliver an exact solution. However, ￿rst order approximations may
produce clearly erroneous results18. Comparing welfare among implementable
policy rules that have no ￿rst-order e⁄ects on the model￿ s deterministic steady
state, we need to rely on higher order approximation methods.
As shown by Kim and Kim (2003)19, in this context ￿rst order approximation
methods are not locally accurate. In general a second-order accurate approxi-
mation to the welfare function requires a second-order expansion to the model￿ s
equilibrium conditions. The ￿rst order approximation solution, is not always
accurate enough due to the certainty equivalence property, i.e. the coincidence
of the ￿rst order approximation to the unconditional means of endogenous vari-
ables with their non stochastic steady state values. This neglects important
e⁄ects of uncertainty on the average level of households￿welfare. A ￿rst or-
16For the technology shock see, Cooley & Prescott (1995, chapter 1 in Cooley￿ s book), or
Prescott 1986.
17They applied to a real business cycle model a special case of the method of linear approx-
imation around deterministic steady states developed in Magill (1977).
18See e.g. Tesar (1992) for an example where completing asset markets will make all agents
worse o⁄, Kim and Kim (2003) for stressing the same results in a two agents stochastic model.
19They show that a welfare comparison based on linear approximation to the policy functions
of a simple two-countries economy, may yield the odd result that welfare is higher under
autarky than under full risk-sharing.
15der approximation to the policy functions would give an incorrect second order
approximation of the welfare function 20.
To overcome this limitation and obtain a second-order accurate approxima-
tion, we adopt a perturbation technique introduced by Fleming (1971) and ap-
plied to various types of economic models by Judd and coauthors21 and recently
generalized by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002)22 (SU henceforth). Second or-
der approximations are quite convenient to implement since, even capturing the
e⁄ects of uncertainty, do not su⁄er from the "curse of dimensionality"23. In
fact, following SU, given the ￿rst-order terms of the Taylor expansions of the
functions expressing the model￿ s solution, the second-order terms can be iden-
ti￿ed by solving a linear system of equations whose terms are the ￿rst order
terms and the derivatives up to the second order of the equilibrium conditions
evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state.
5.2 Welfare Measure and Optimal Rules
How should monetary policy be conducted in a world economy with credit fric-
tions at the household level? In order to answer this question, we rely on
utility-based welfare calculations, assuming that the benevolent monetary au-
thority maximize the utility of the households subject to the model￿ s equilibrium















20See Woodford (2002) and Kim et al. (200?) for a discussion of situations in which
second-order accurate welfare evaluations can be obtained using ￿rst-order approximations to
the policy functions.
21See Judd and Guu (1993,1997) for applications to deterministic and stochastic, contin-
uous and discrete-time growth models in one state variable, Gaspar and Judd (1997) for
multidimentional stochastic models in continuous time approximated up to the fourth-order,
Judd (1998) presents the general method , Jin and Judd (2001) extended these methods to
more general rational expectations models .
22They derive a second-order approximation to the policy function of a general class of
dynamic, discrete-time, rational expectations models. They show that in a second-order
expansion of the policy functions, the coe¢ cients on the linear and quadratic terms in the
state vector are independent of the volatility of the exogenous shocks. Thus, only the constant
term is a⁄ected by uncertainty.
23Models with large numbers of state variables can be solved without much computational
e⁄ort.
16where ￿i are the weights on households￿utilities. We choose ￿1=(1-￿1) and
￿2=(1-￿2).
We measure welfare as the conditional expectation at time zero (t = 0), time
in which all state variables of the economy equal their steady state values. Since
di⁄erent policy regimes, even not a⁄ecting the non-stochastic steady state, are
associated with di⁄erent stochastic steady states, in order to not neglect the
welfare e⁄ects during the transition from one to another steady state, we use
a conditional welfare criterion. Thus, we evaluate welfare conditional on the
initial state being the non stochastic steady state24.
We evaluate the optimal setting of monetary policy in the constrained class
of simple interest rate rules. Thus, we assume that the central bank follows an
interest rate rule of the form
Rt = ￿(X)
Where X represents easily observable macroeconomic indicators tested as pos-













with s=f0;1g:As implementability condition is required policies to deliver local
uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium. Following SU we require
that the associate equilibrium be locally unique. We also exclude bifurcation
points. The con￿guration of parameters satisfying the requirements and yield-
ing the highest welfare gives the optimal implementable rule. In characterizing
optimal policy we search over a grid considering di⁄erent ranges of the para-
meters. Then, we compute the welfare level - V ￿






















i;j denote the contingent planes for consumption, housing
and labor under the optimal policy regime.
24An alternative to condition on a particular initial state could be to condition on a distrib-
ution of values for the initial state. Anyway, when there is a time-inconsistency problem, the
optimality of the rule may depens on the initial conditions. A way to overcome this problem
could be to ￿nd the rule that would prevail under commitment from a "timeless perspective"
see Giannoni and Woodford (2002).
17In order to compare di⁄erent rules, we relate the deviations of the welfare
associated to the di⁄erent rules from the steady state welfare.
6 Optimal Simple Rules
In order to investigate how monetary policy should be optimally designed in
a model with housing prices we maximize the households￿total welfare with
respect to the coe¢ cients of a simple monetary policy rule. As in the monetary
business cycle literature, we assume that the nominal interest rate responds to
in￿ ation and output and lagged interest rate. Following the literature on asset
prices and monetary policy we also consider the optimality of responding to
current housing prices movements. Thus, we search over the coe¢ cient of an
implicit interest rate rule - ￿￿, ￿y;￿R and ￿q - using a grid [1,3] for ￿￿, [0,0.9]
for ￿R, [0,2] for ￿y and ￿q
25. Table 2 summarize the main ￿ndings. We report
the welfare loss with respect to the steady state￿ s welfare.
Optimization over this simple rule shows that the central bank should not
take into account variations of housing prices from the steady state level. This
means that housing prices are not the right variable to optimally design a simple
monetary policy rule in this economy. The optimal rule is instead character-
ized by a positive strong response to in￿ ation deviations from its target. In
fact, ￿￿ equals the upper limit of its parameter space. On the contrary, it￿ s
not optimal to react to output. These results are consistent with the one ob-
tained by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). They also show that it is optimal
to respond to deviations of output from potential output but not to output
variations. While the concept of "output gap" is well understood in models
characterized only by ine¢ ciencies related to price stickiness, the de￿nition of
potential output in our economy is not clear. Interest rate smoothing turns out
to be also not optimal. Being our model economy cashless, in absence of capital,
the only motive for having a smoothing on the interest rate would come from
the existence of credit friction. However, it turns out that targeting the lagged
interest rate it is not optimal.
Figure1 shows the combination of parameters ￿￿ and ￿q for the implicit
interest rule, under which the equilibrium is determinate.
25We consider 25 linearly spaced points for each coe¢ cient.
18Optimal Simple Rule
^ Rt = ￿R ^ Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿￿^ ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿y^ yt + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿q^ qt
￿R = 0 ￿￿ = 3 ￿y = 0 ￿q = 0
Welfare Loss = 0:00937003
Table 2
The welfare loss represent the loss in terms of consumption
with respect to the steady state￿ s welfare.
As it is often argued in the monetary policy literature the implicit rules are
not implementable in practise. For this reason we adopt a simple rule according
to which the nominal interest rate reacts to last period in￿ ation, output and
housing prices. The result turns out to be the same: targeting housing prices is
not optimal.
Lagged Interest Rate Rule
^ Rt = ￿R ^ Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿￿^ ￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿y^ yt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿q^ qt￿1
￿R = 0 ￿￿ = 3 ￿y = 0 ￿q = 0
Welfare Loss = 0:00937858
Table 3
The welfare loss represent the loss in terms of consumption with
respect to the steady state￿ s welfare.
Figure 2-3 show the di⁄erences in the response to shocks between economies
targeting or not housing prices. As standard result in these kind of models a pos-
itive (negative) transitory technology shock is shifting (increasing/decreasing)
the aggregate supply having, ceteris paribus, a negative (positive) e⁄ect on in-
￿ ation and a negative (positive) e⁄ect on total labor supply. Using a Taylor kind
rule the CB is loosening (tightening) monetary policy. However housing prices
(given the inelastic supply of housing) are positively related to total consump-
tion ￿which in the model is strictly related to output, hence they will track the
shock. So a CB reacting to housing price conditionally to a technology shock is
partly o⁄setting the weight given to in￿ ation. In other words it is like targeting
the shock itself. So the distortion coming from price dispersion is much higher
than the ones coming from redistribution.
From ￿g 2 We can see how a rule without any target on housing price
reduces the impact on prices. On the other hand, there is almost no di⁄erence
for housing prices. This con￿rms the interpretation that, being housing prices
strictly related to total consumption which in turn is driven by the shock, a
target on ￿q￿is very similar to a direct reaction to ￿Zt￿ .
19What is interesting is that a reaction to ￿q￿is smoothing the impatient￿ s
expenditures, but housing, and labor e⁄ort response (viceversa for the patient).
From the impatient Euler equation we can see that a full stabilization of his
consumption is possible only if the lagrange multiplier that measure the degree
of the credit friction (and housing) is absorbing all the variations in the nominal
rate and expected in￿ ation26. This means that the higher the CB reaction to
in￿ ation the higher is the adjustment weight borne by the impatient.
Also in the case of a government shock, the conditional correlation between
in￿ ation and housing prices is negative. However now the reasons are di⁄erent.
Total consumption, given ricardian consumers, is falling while output (total
labor) is increasing. So a positive aggregate demand shock has a positive impact
on in￿ ation but a negative one on housing prices (this depends also clearly from
the assumption that the government does not buy houses). Again a central
bank￿ s reaction to housing prices is o⁄setting the one to in￿ ation. However,
also in this case, impatient consumption and labor e⁄ort response is much more
smoothed.
Table 4 compares the optimal implicit simple rule with a number of di⁄erent
ad hoc rules using the welfare based approach. As already explained in section
5.2 in order to compare di⁄erent rules we relate the deviations of the welfare
associated to the di⁄erent rules from the steady state welfare.









^ Rt= ￿￿^ ￿t+￿y^ yt
￿￿ = 3 ￿y = :5 0:13115 0:1218
￿￿ = 1:5 ￿y = :5 1:07945 1:0701
^ Rt= ￿￿^ ￿t+￿q^ qt
￿￿ = 3 ￿q = 1 0:98708 0:9777
^ Rt= ￿￿^ ￿t+￿y^ yt+￿q^ qt
￿￿ = 3 ￿y = :5 ￿q = 1 1:47957 1:4702
￿￿ = 2 ￿y = :5 ￿q = 1 5:20375 5:1944
Interest Rate Smoothing
^ Rt= ￿R^ Rt￿1+(1 ￿ ￿R)￿￿^ ￿t+(1 ￿ ￿R)￿y^ yt
￿R = :9 ￿￿ = 3 0:01551353 0:0061
￿R = :6 ￿￿ = 3 0:00967056 3:0053e ￿ 004
￿R = :9 ￿￿ = 1:5 0:08176999 0:0724
^ Rt= ￿R^ Rt￿1+(1 ￿ ￿R)￿￿^ ￿t+(1 ￿ ￿R)￿y^ yt
￿R = :9 ￿￿ = 3 ￿y = :5 0:16378627 0:1544
￿R = :9 ￿￿ = 1:5 ￿y = :5 1:04395526 1:0346
^ Rt= ￿R^ Rt￿1+(1 ￿ ￿R)￿￿^ ￿t+(1 ￿ ￿R)￿q^ qt
￿R = :9 ￿￿ = 3 ￿q = 1 2:10236651 2:0930
^ Rt= ￿R^ Rt￿1+(1 ￿ ￿R)￿￿^ ￿t+(1 ￿ ￿R)￿y^ yt+(1 ￿ ￿R)￿q^ qt
￿R = :9 ￿￿ = 3 ￿y = :5 ￿q = 1 2:10296440 2:0936
￿R = :9 ￿￿ = 2 ￿y = :5 ￿q = 1 8:95578571 8:9464
Table 4
The welfare loss represent the loss in terms of consumption with respect to the steady state￿ s
welfare. The % Loss is the welfare loss with respect to the optimal rule
Introducing a reaction to housing prices movements in the optimal simple
rule turns out to be welfare reducing. In fact, a unitary response to current
housing prices implies a 1% welfare loss with respect to the optimal rule. Dif-
ferently from the most recent literature on asset prices and monetary policy we
do not ￿nd that there are gains, even if often negligible, from having a target on
asset prices movements. Our results clearly show that targeting housing prices
is welfare reducing27.
It is worthy to notice that a reaction to output is welfare reducing as well.
27Iacoviello (2004) shows that, in a model characterized by housing as a collateral for ￿rms
and households, a response to housing prices yields gains in terms of output and in￿ation
stabilization even if not quantitatively signi￿cant. Looking at optimal simple rules in a world
characterized by credit frictions at the ￿rms￿ level, Faia and Monacelli (2004) show that
reactions to asset prices is optimal but do not generate relevant welfare improvements.
21The percentage loss is higher, the lower is the response to in￿ ation. In fact,
a 0.5 response to output, reduce welfare of about 0.1% when the response to
in￿ ation is 3 and about 1% when ￿￿is set to 1.5. Even worse the case in which
the interest rate also responds to housing prices. The welfare loss is of 1.5% in
the ￿rst case and 5% in the second one in absence of interest rate smoothing
and respectively of about 2% and 8% in presence of a target on lagged interest
rate in addition to in￿ ation, housing prices and output. A positive interest rate
smoothing makes worse the welfare performance of the simple rules considered.
6.1 Access to the credit market and optimal monetary
policy
Now we check the robustness of the results under di⁄erent values for the loan-to-
value ratio. In the baseline model we assume that households can borrow up to
the 50% of the expected next period value of their house28. Independently from
the value for ￿ the optimal result is unchanged (See Table5). Thus, the degree of
access to the credit market doesn￿ t a⁄ect the design of optimal monetary policy.
The welfare loss with respect to the steady state￿ s welfare decreases with ￿.
Optimal Simple Rules
rule ^ Rt = ￿R ^ Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿￿^ ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿y^ yt + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿q^ qt
optimal
weights ￿R = 0 ￿￿ = 3 ￿q = 0 ￿y = 0
￿ ￿ = :001 ￿ = :3 ￿ = :4 ￿ = :6
Welfare
Loss 0:00978993 0:00962163 0:00951627 0:00917090
Table 5
The welfare loss represent the loss in terms of consumption with respect to the
steady state￿ s welfare
However, as Table 6 shows, the welfare cost of deviating from the optimal
rule, increases with ￿. In fact, the welfare cost of adding a target to housing
prices, last period interest rate or output additional to in￿ ation is higher the
higher the degree of access to the credit market.
28In Italy for instance, until the mid-80 a maximum loan to value ratio of 50% was imposed
by regulation. Following the process of deregulation it was increased to 75% in 1986 and to
100% in 1995
22Deviating From Optimality
￿ ￿ = 0:001 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:4 ￿ = 0:6
weights ￿￿ = 3 ￿q = 1
welfare loss 0:93544628 0:95492812 0:96848473 1:01134530
% Loss relative 0:9257 0:9453 0:9590 1:0022
weights ￿￿ = 3 ￿q = 1 ￿y = 0:5
welfare loss 1:39750869 1:42845289 1:44974618 1:52065058
% Loss relative 1:3877 1:4188 1:4402 1:5115
weights ￿￿ = 3 ￿R = 0:9
welfare loss 0:01464221 0:01505223 0:01525402 0:01586302
% Loss relative 0:0049 0:0054 0:0057 0:0067
Table 6
The welfare loss represent the loss in terms of consumption with respect to
the steady state￿ s welfare. The % Loss is the welfare loss with respect to
the optimal rule
We now look at in￿ ation￿ s volatility under di⁄erent rules. As expected the
optimal rule, independently of ￿, implies the lowest volatility. If more variables
then in￿ ation are targeted, the volatility of in￿ ation increases. As already shown
in the impulse-responses, a target on housing prices reduces the e⁄ectiveness of
the target on in￿ ation. The same holds for a target on output. The contribution
of targeting lagged interest rate to in￿ ation volatility is, instead, negligible.
Consistently with the results on the cost of deviating from the optimal rule,
over the di⁄erent rules considered, in￿ ation volatility slightly increases with ￿
Only exception is the optimal rule￿ s case. Thus, unless the central bank follows
the optimal rule, increasing the access to the credit market, and thus reducing
the ine¢ ciency, implies an increase in in￿ ation￿ s volatility.
Simple Rules and In￿ ation Volatility
^ Rt = ￿R ^ Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿￿^ ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿y^ yt + (1 ￿ ￿R)￿q^ qt
￿ ￿ = 0:001 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:6 ￿ = 0:75
￿￿ = 3 (optimal simple rule) 5.1381e-004 4.9396e-004 4.4721e-004 4.0620e-004
￿￿ = 3;￿q = 1 0.0106 0.0106 0.0108 0.01082
￿￿ = 3;￿R = 0:9 7.9057e-004 7.9812e-004 8.0498e-004 7.9310e-004
￿￿ = 1:5;￿y = 0:5 0.0134 0.0135 0.01356 0.01356
￿￿ = 3;￿q = 1;￿y = 0:5 0.0137 0.01378 0.0140 0.01417
￿R = 0:9;￿￿ = 3;￿q = 1;￿y = 0:5 0.01445 0.014866 0.01612 0.01822
Table 7
237 Conclusions
We study optimal monetary policy rules in an economy with credit market
frictions at the household level and heterogeneous agents. In order to asses the
role of housing prices in designing monetary policy we rely on a model built
on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (KM henceforth).Thus, two types of agents,
di⁄ering in terms of discount factors, are assumed and credit constraints arise
because lenders cannot force borrowers to repay. Physical assets are then used
as collateral for loans.
As a result housing prices￿movements should not be a separate target vari-
able additional to in￿ ation in an optimally designed simple monetary policy
rule. In fact, an explicit objective of housing prices stability is welfare reducing
w.r.t. a strict price stability policy. Our results are in line with the idea that
under normal circumstances asset prices should not be considered a target of
monetary policy as already stressed by Svensson (2004)29.
The introduction of an housing prices￿target in the reaction function of the
central bank implies a welfare loss that becomes quantitatively more signi￿cant
the higher the degree of access to the credit market. In fact, reducing the credit
market imperfections implies a decrease in in￿ ation￿ s volatility and a welfare
improvements if and only if the central bank follows an optimally designed
simple rule.
29Svensson argues that performing a ￿exible in￿ation targeting there is no need for the ECB
to take asset prices movements into account.
24References
[1] Aoki, Kosuke, James Proudman and Jan Vlieghe (2001), ￿Houses as Col-
lateral: Has the Link between House Prices and Consumption Changed?￿ ,
mimeo, Bank of England.
[2] Bernanke, Ben S., and Mark Gertler (1989), ￿Agency Costs, Net Worth and
Business Fluctuations,￿American Economic Review, 79, March, 14-31.
[3] Bernanke, B., M. Gertler and S. Gilchrist (1999). ￿The Financial Accel-
erator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework￿ , in J.B. Taylor, and
M. Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics, Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
[4] Chari, V.V. and P.J. Kehoe (1998), ￿Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy￿ ,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Sta⁄ Report
251.
[5] Debelle Guy (2004), "Macroeconomic Implications of rising household
debt", BIS wp 153.
[6] Faia E. and T. Monacelli (2004), "Welfare-Maximizing Interest Rate Rules,
Asset Prices and Credit Frictions", mimeo.
[7] Gilchrist, Simon, and John V. Leahy (2002), ￿Monetary Policy and Asset
Prices￿ , Journal of Monetary Economics, 49, 75-97.
[8] Khan, A., R. King and A.L. Wolman (2000), ￿Optimal Monetary Policy￿ ,
Federal Reserve of Richmond w.p. No. 00-10.
[9] Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (1997), ￿Credit Cycles￿ , Journal of Political
Economy, 105, April 211-48.25
[10] Iacoviello Matteo(2003) , ￿House Prices, Borrowing Constraints and Mon-
etary Policy in the Business Cycle￿Boston College wp.
[11] Jappelli, Tullio, and Marco Pagano (1989), ￿Aggregate consumption and
capital market imperfections: an international comparison￿ , American Eco-
nomic Review, December, 79, 5, 1088-1105.
[12] Kask J., Household Debt and Finacial Stability, Kroon&Economy n4, 2003.
25[13] Poterba, James, (2000), ￿Stock Market Wealth and Consumption￿ . Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 14, Spring, 99-118.
[14] Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe (2001), ￿Optimal Fiscal and Monetary
Policy Under Sticky Prices￿ , Journal of Economic Theory.
[15] Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe (2001), ￿Optimal Fiscal and Monetary
Policy Under Imperfect Competition￿ , mimeo, Rutgers University and Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania.
[16] Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe (2003), ￿Optimal Simple Monetary and
Fiscal Rules in An Economy with Capital￿ , mimeo, Duke University.




The real wage in steady state equals the real marginal cost:










Since the deterministic steady state for the other variables is not solvable
analytically, a nonlinear root￿nding problem arises. In a nonlinear root￿nding
problem, a function f mapping Rn to Rn is given and one must compute an n-
vector x, called a root of f, that satis￿es f(x) = 0. In our problem the f(x) is
represented by the following equations:
￿UL1 = Uc1w ￿UL2 = Uc2w
Uh1
q = Uc1 (1 ￿ ￿1)
Uh2
q = Uc2 (1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿￿








b2 = ￿qh2 b1 = nb2
(1￿n)







c = (1 ￿ n)c1 + nc2 L = (1 ￿ n)L1 + nL2
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The set of equilibrium conditions and the welfare function of the model can be
written as:
Etf(yt+1;yt;xt+1;xt) = 0
where Et is the expectation operator,yt is the vector of non-predetermined
variable and xt of predetermined variables. This last vector constists of x1
t en-
dogenous predetermined state variables and x2
t exogenous state variables. In








The welfare function is given by the conditional expectation of lifetime utility







optimum it will be: Vit = U(ci;t;hi;t;Li;t)+￿iEtVit+1:We add to the system of
equilibrium conditions, two equations in two unknons: V1t and V2t:
The vector of exogenous state variables follows a stochastic process:
x2
t+1 = ￿x2
t + ￿"t+1 "t ￿ iidN(0;￿)
where ￿ a matrix of known parameters30.
The solution of the model is given by the policy function and the transition
function:
yt = g(xt;￿) xt = h(xt;￿) + ￿"t+1 where ￿2 is the variance of the
shocks.
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), we compute numerically the
second order approximation of the functions g and h around the non-stochastic
steady state xt = x and ￿ = 0. The solution of the system gives an evolution
















30In our model, since the shocks ar uncorrelated, ￿ is a vector.
28where all the variables are expressed in log deviations. The solution also
depends on the variance of the shocks.
Since we evaluate the welfare functions conditional on having at t=0 all the
variables of the economy equal to their steady state values, the second order




Vi is a vector of known parameters that depends on the monetary
policy used and ￿2 is the variance of the shocks
31Since in the system all the variables are in log-deviation from their steady state values,
they equals zero.
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